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IT Outsourcing Relationship Quality 
Dimensions and Drivers: 
Empirical Evidence from the Financial Industry 
Stefan Blumenberg
E-Finance Lab/ J. W. Goethe University
blumenberg@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de
ABSTRACT
This work contributes to outsourcing research by shedding some light on IT outsourcing relationships. A theoretical model is 
developed that shows the influence of determinants on relationship quality. Relationship quality is captured by a set of five 
dimensions from previous literature and enhanced by two new dimensions (communication quality, forbearance). Determi-
nants from the literature are extended by two new elements (interaction structure, service quality). By using a case study ap-
proach from the German financial industry, we show the applicability of interaction structures and service quality as relation-
ship quality determinants. Interaction structures like employee trainings or transfer of staff have a strong positive impact on 
communication quality and mutual business understanding, whereas service quality mainly influences the level of conflict in 
a relationship. The results regarding the two proposed relationship quality dimensions are mixed. Communication quality is a 
good measure for capturing relationship quality and shows strong connections to interaction intensity and interactions struc-
tures. The applicability of forbearance as a relationship quality dimension is ambiguous. Some banks see forbearance as di-
mension of relationship quality, while others use forbearance as a strategic element to force the provider into delivering addi-
tional or better services.
Keywords
IT outsourcing, relationship quality, relationship determinants, case studies, financial industry
INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing of information technology became an important approach for many firms to focus on core competencies or to 
reduce costs. Increasing levels of outsourcing require companies to put much effort in the management of these relationships.
Clark, Zmud, and McGray (1998) state that “the truly critical success factors associated with successful outsourcing are those 
associated with vendor governance”. Initially, literature dealt with two governance modes, namely contractual governance 
and relational governance, separately. Both modes were seen as substitutes, not as complements (Poppo and Zenger 2002). 
Currently, there is a general agreement in the literature that any IT outsourcing relationship requires both a relational facet 
and a contractual facet as equally important governance mechanisms (Gellings and Wüllenweber 2007; Goo 2007; Poppo and 
Zenger 2002). 
This relational facet has been analyzed by some researchers and a set of relationship quality dimensions and determinants has 
been identified (Goles and Chin 2005; Lee and Kim 1999). However, research in the area of the identification of relationship 
quality dimensions and its drivers is scarce, although a “greater understanding of how to manage IT outsourcing relationships 
that create and sustain strategic value for the client firm is required“ (Goo 2007). In particular, “to date there has been a rela-
tive lack of empirical studies that focus on the elements that comprise the relationship“ (Goles, Chin 2005). To address these 
propositions, we want to enlarge the understanding of the drivers that influence relationships and pose the question “Are in-
teraction structures and service quality relevant drivers that influence relationship quality?”. To enhance the understanding of 
relationship quality dimensions we ask “How can forbearance and communication quality contribute to the measurement of 
relationship quality?” Both questions are evaluated with four case studies in the German and Swiss financial industry.
RESEARCH MODEL
The research model that guides our work in developing a better understanding of relationship quality and its determinants is 
presented in figure 1. It consists of relationship quality as endogenous variable that is split in seven dimensions (presented in 
the following chapter, proposed dimensions are underlined) and interaction structure, interaction intensity, service quality and 
contractual governance as exogenous variables (proposed drivers shown in circles with bold lines). Contextual variables 
complement the model.
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Relationship quality
IT outsourcing literature has been dealing with the relationship between customer and provider as an important part of out-
sourcing for about 13 years (Klepper 1995; Lacity and Willcocks 1995; McFarlan and Nolan 1995). In a first empirical study 
Grover et al. (1996) showed the importance of a good relationship on the outsourcing success followed by a couple of other 
conceptual (Kern and Willcocks 2000b; Kishore, Rao, Nam, Rajagopalan and Chaudhury 2003; Sabherwal 1999) and empiri-
cal works (Kern and Blois 2002; Kern and Willcocks 2002; Lee 2001) with the focus on the relational aspects of outsourcing. 
The works from Lee and Kim (1999) and Goles and Chin (2005) were the first with a holistic view on relationship quality. 
One of their goals was to identify a broad set of relationship quality dimensions. Lee and Kim (1999) identified five dimen-
sions of relationship quality from social exchange theory (Lee and Kim 1999). Compared to Lee and Kim (1999), Goles and 
Chin broadened their view and reviewed IT outsourcing, interorganizational relationship, marketing and organizational man-
agement literature in order to identify six dimensions of relationship quality. Figure 2 shows the dimensions from both pa-
pers. White boxes represent dimensions from Goles and Chin (2005), grey boxes are derived from Lee and Kim (1999), con-
structs in the striped boxes are used in both works.
Service
quality
Contractual
governance
Interaction
intensity
Contextual
factors
Interaction
structure
Relationship quality
(Commitment, communication quality, conflict, consensus, 
forbearance, mutual understanding, trust)
H1 H2 H3 H4
Figure 1. Research Model
In our research approach, we use the six relationship quality dimensions depicted in the box of figure 2. 
Goles and Chin (2005) Lee and Kim (1999)
Business 
understanding
Conflict
Consensus
Flexibility
Commtiment
Trust
Cultural
compatibility
Interdepedence
Benefit and 
risk share
Figure 2. Relationship Quality Dimensions from Goles and Chin (2005) and Lee and Kim (1999)
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The three constructs on the bottom of figure 2 are used as determinants instead, for the following reasons:
• Cultural compatibility is a driver that influences the quality of a relationship (Lee and Kim 1999; Sarkar, Cavusgil 
and Aulakh 2001; Wilkof, Brown and Selsky 1995) but does not necessarily reflect it. This holds especially true in 
an outsourcing relationship where different corporate cultures may negatively influence the relationship quality, i.e. 
having a negative impact on trust, communication quality or on reaching consensus (Lee and Kim 1999). 
• Interdependence “suggests that the parties have complimentary assets and skills. They need each other to achieve 
their respective goals” (Goles and Chin 2005). This construct is derived from marketing literature (Gundlach and 
Cadotte 1994) and organizational science literature (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In an outsourcing context, interde-
pendence cannot be used in this vein. First, as described by the resource based view, every outsourcing deal heavily 
relies on the complementary asset of the involved companies (Cheon, Grover and Teng 1995; Grover, Cheon and 
Teng 1994). Providers offer their customer a broad spectrum of technologies as well as a technologically-oriented 
skill-set of their employees (Grover et al. 1996). In turn, customers compensate the providers for their service. Sec-
ondly, dependency between customer and IT provider will be extremely high in nearly every IT outsourcing case. 
Long-time contractually-agreed upon relationship periods and high integration levels of different IT systems within 
an organization will nearly always lead to high interdependencies when IT providers provide IT services. In con-
trast, customer-supplier relationships might show a highly diverse level of interdependence (Gundlach and Cadotte 
1994): the discrete procurement of office consumption items exhibits a much lesser interdependence between firms 
than the procurement of strategically important goods like engines in an automotive company. 
• Benefit and risk sharing is an often-used mechanism in outsourcing to offer both the provider and the customer an 
incentive for an extraordinary performance (Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim and Jayatilaka 2004). This penalty reward 
system is usually part of the outsourcing contract (Gellings 2007). The outsourcing contract governs the most impor-
tant aspects of the outsourcing deal (Kern and Willcocks 2000a) and also influences the relationship quality (Poppo 
and Zenger 2002), but it does not represent a dimension of relationship quality itself. 
In the following, the relationship quality dimension flexibility will be integrated into the dimension commitment. Goles and 
Chin (2005) measure flexibility as the “willingness to accommodate each other as conditions change”. Willingness in this 
context describes the commitment of the provider, not what the provider is able to. Therefore, flexibility is differentiated by a 
commitment and an ability part. The ability part of flexibility describes a set of technological abilities that the provider can 
use to behave flexibly. Independent from this set of abilities, the provider might offer the customer only a smaller flexibility 
subset, which is its commitment. For instance, the provider is able to develop specific software within a timeframe of two 
weeks, under the assignment of all available personnel. If the customer is not that important, the provider might only offer 
him a development timeframe of four weeks. As the customer only sees this commitment part, flexibility is captured within 
the dimension commitment. If possible, the ability part of flexibility is captured within the determinant service quality 
(Parasuraman, Berry and Zeithaml 1991; Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 1985; Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 1994).
The dimensions to measure relationship quality are visualized in figure 3 in alphabetical order and defined in the following.  
Boxes with bold lines contain the proposed new dimensions communication quality and forbearance.
Relationship quality
Conflict
Mutual understanding
Commitment
Consensus
Communication
quality
Forbearance
Trust
Figure 3. Relationship Quality Dimensions
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Commitment “refers to an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity between exchange partners” (Dwyer, Schurr 
and Oh 1987). In an outsourcing context the involved firms can make personal as well as financial resources available to sus-
tain the relationship over time (Goles and Chin 2005). This includes high willingness to flexibly react to changing conditions.
The amount of conflicts between parties is a crucial factor to capture the status of an outsourcing relationship (Anderson and 
Narus 1990). This dimension relates negatively to the overall relationship quality construct.
Consensus “is the extent of general agreement between parties” (Mejias, Shepherd, Vogel and Lazaneo 1996). A comparable 
mindset between the employees of both companies, in terms of a general understanding of the other party, helps to reach a 
consensus (Subramani, Henderson and Cooprider 1999). 
Based on the IT business alignment literature, mutual understanding is defined as “the ability of IT and business […], at a 
deep level, to understand and be able to participate in the other´s key processes” (Reich and Benbasat 2000). This mutual 
understanding is especially important in an IT outsourcing context (Kern 1997; Lee and Kim 1999) and consistent with pre-
vious IS research that points out the importance of IS managers to understand business requirements, constraints and oppor-
tunities (Lee, Trauth and Farwell 1995; Ross, Beath and Goodhue 1996).
Trust is defined as “the firm's belief that another company will perform actions that will result in positive outcomes for the 
firm, as well as not take unexpected actions that would result in negative outcomes for the firm” (Anderson and Narus 1990; 
Hart and Saunders 1997). Consistent with IS literature, trust is used as an important factor to maintain and manage an ongo-
ing outsourcing relationship (Kern 1997; Willcocks and Kern 1998).
Communication quality describes the efficiency and effectiveness of information exchange between partners (Blumenberg, 
Beimborn and König 2008). Goles and Chin (2005) describe communication to be a relationship determinant. As an exten-
sion of this view, we argue that communication is a more multifaceted construct that has to be differentiated in quantitative 
and qualitative aspects (Blumenberg et al. 2008). Organizational procedures like job rotation, workshops or higher amounts 
of communication can positively influence communication quality and overall relationship quality. Hence, communication 
quality is used as a relationship quality dimension, the quantitative aspects of communication are considered, instead, as a 
determinant (see interaction intensity below).
Forbearance “is forgoing certain behaviors that are not in the best interest of both parties” (Marcolin and McLellan 1998). 
Forbearance stems from the international joint venture literature (Parkhe 1993) and was introduced by Marcolin and 
McLellan (1998) in an outsourcing context as general element that is inherently required for strategic partnerships. We follow 
their argumentation and propose that forbearance is an important aspect when measuring relationship quality. Forbearance is 
required to describe the reciprocity and the “give-and-take” between partners. A good partnership consists of a relationship 
with both parties acting, to a certain degree, forbearing towards each other (Marcolin and McLellan 1998). This can be a re-
strained behavior of the customer in case of problems generated by the provider, i.e. not to instantly escalate problems to 
higher hierarchical levels, not to immediately demand penalties from the provider or, generally speaking, not to take the con-
tract out of the drawer very often.
Relationship Quality Determinants
Lee and Kim (1999) showed the positive impact of communication on relationship quality. As described above, we have di-
vided communication in a quantitative and a qualitative part and use the quantitative part (interaction intensity) as driver for 
relationship quality. Another important factor in outsourcing relationships is the outsourcing contract. Nearly every outsourc-
ing deal is based on a contract (Gellings 2007) that has a considerable influence on relationship quality (Poppo and Zenger 
2002). The determinants from literature and the proposed drivers being interaction structure and service quality are described 
in the following.
Interaction Structure 
Interaction between customers and outsourcing providers is the basis for a relationship. Lee and Kim (1999) show the impact 
of communication on relationship quality. As a prerequisite for communication, interaction structures and mechanisms have 
to be implemented and accepted by both parties (Wagner 2006). To clarify the interaction structure in an outsourcing context, 
three main interaction structures are proposed which contribute to an information exchange. 
Literature pinpoints the importance of “boundary spanners” in business-to-business exchanges to bridge the gap between 
cooperating organizations (Ferguson, Paulin and Bergeron 2005; Galbraith 1977). Boundary spanners can be people or units, 
depending on the size of the organization. We adopt this general concept of “boundary spanners” and apply it to an IT out-
sourcing context, where financial service providers usually have implemented retained organizations that, inter alia, govern 
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their IT providers (Joha 2003). These liaison units typically have counterparts on the provider side. In some cases, these 
counterparts are former bank employees that have moved from the bank to the provider in the beginning of the relationship.
Another way to promote business and IT-knowledge are knowledge transfer routines between customer and provider em-
ployees. Wagner (2006) demonstrated the positive impact of interaction structures on IT business alignment. We adopt this 
finding and apply it to outsourcing relationships. In an outsourcing context, these structures can be job rotations, traineeships, 
regular workshops, trainings, mixed workgroups or electronic systems like repositories to disseminate bank specific and 
technical information between parties (Broadbent and Weill 1993; Ortega 2001). 
Mohr and Spekman (1994) show the positive impact of conflict resolution techniques on partnership success. Conflicts will 
arise in any outsourcing relationship. Hence, the existence of a conflict resolution structure will be helpful to accelerate their 
solution. 
H1: The existence of interaction structures leads to higher relationship quality.
Interaction Intensity
An interaction structure provides the basis for actual information exchange in terms of formal or informal communication. 
Generally speaking, communication “refers to the extent to which critical, often proprietary, information is communicated to 
one’s partner“ (Mohr and Spekman 1994). Previous research on inter-organizational relationships has identified communica-
tion to be an important factor for successful partnerships (Kanter 1994; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monczka, Petersen, Hand-
field and Ragatz 1998; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Outsourcing researchers adapted this view and showed the positive cor-
relation between communication and outsourcing success (Grover et al. 1996; McFarlan and Nolan 1995; Poppo and Zenger 
2002) as well as the impact of communication on relationship quality in general (Goles 2001; Goles and Chin 2005; Lee and 
Kim 1999) or particular dimensions such as trust (Anderson and Narus 1990; Holmström, Conchuir, Pär and Fitzgerald 2006; 
Willcocks and Kern 1998).
Formal communication refers to situations where officially organized information is exchanged, e.g. meetings between pro-
vider and client. By contrast, informal communication is “that which remains when rules and hierarchies, as ways of coordi-
nating activities, are eliminated” (Kraut, Fish, Root and Chalfonte 1990) and when people meet outside of work, e.g. meet-
ings in bars after official working hours. The exchange of information between both parties in an outsourcing deal is geared 
towards “the joint accomplishment of the individual party’s objectives” (Dibbern et al. 2004) which is addressed by relational 
exchange theory (RET) (Goles and Chin 2002). The fundamental assumption of RET is that there will be an agreement on a 
superior benefit from cooperation for all partners (referring to the reciprocity concept in social exchange theory), compared to 
other forms of exchange or to cooperation with other potential partners (Anderson and Narus 1990; Dwyer et al. 1987). 
H2: Higher amount of communication between vendor and client leads to higher relationship quality.
Service Quality
Service quality is defined as the “extent to which the vendor´s systems and functions meet or exceed the customer´s expecta-
tions” (Goles 2003). The delivered quality of services is an integral part of an outsourcing relationship. Customers expect 
their providers to deliver their service in time and budget, to be reliable and to behave proactively (Kettinger and Lee 1997). 
All efforts of the customer as well as the provider should be directed toward the provision of an excellent service. Prior stud-
ies show the positive impact of service quality on the organizational performance (DeLone and McLean 1992; Seddon 1997). 
Quite obviously, service quality in an IT outsourcing relationship represents a critical driver, respectively an enabler for rela-
tionship quality (Blumenberg et al. 2008). For example, customers who receive a service quality they expected or better are 
less likely to have a demanding IT outsourcing relationship where both parties have to struggle with each other in frequent 
conflicts.
H3: High service quality enables high relationship quality.
Contractual Governance
Contracts are an integral part of outsourcing in governing the different phases of an outsourcing relationship (transition, de-
livery and exit phase) (Poppo and Zenger 2002). For the formal delivery phase, contracts contain elements to describe the 
pricing, duration of contract, liability clauses, and the type, amount, and quality of services, usually defined in service level 
agreements (SLAs) (Domberger, Fernandez and Fiebig 2000; Ferguson et al. 2005; Saunders, Gebelt and Hu 1997). SLAs are 
of particular importance because they describe in detail the availability of systems, the time of recovery and might also con-
tain penalties for poor service (Goo, Kishore and Rao 2004). But solely defining services levels is not sufficient; companies 
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need mechanisms to control the quality of the delivered services (Kern and Willcocks 2000a; Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny 
1995). Customers can rely on the reports prepared by the provider or they can implement their own measurement system 
(Willcocks, Lacity and Fitzgerald 1995). Contracts are regarded as an important part of managing the outsourcing relation-
ship (Gellings and Wüllenweber 2006), but they suffer from a significant shortcoming: contracts are inherently incomplete as 
they cannot address every future uncertainty (MacNeil 1980). RET takes this issue into account and refers to a set of com-
plementary norms which are related to the establishment, preservation, and improvement of a relationship (MacNeil 1980; 
Spriggs and Gundlach 1996). 
H4: A reasonable level of contractual governance leads to higher relationship quality. Contrariwise, too much contractual 
governance can lead to decreasing relationship quality.
Contextual Factors
Ein-Dor and Segev (1978, 1982) were one of the first to show the impact of contextual variables on IS structure (organiza-
tional maturity, organization size, and extra-organizational situation, inter alia). Based on these contextual variables, we pro-
pose four factors that have a major influence on relationship quality. 
Beimborn et al. (2005) showed that prior outsourcing experience of managers has a strong impact on the evaluation of the 
competencies of external service providers. Gewald (2006) illustrates how different outsourcing experiences impact man-
ager´s perception of business process outsourcing objectives. Lacity (1998) reports about experienced managers getting better 
outsourcing deal conditions compared to inexperienced executives. In the same vein, outsourcing experience impacts rela-
tionship quality. 
Many IT outsourcing works use interdependence as a construct influencing relationship quality (Lee and Kim 1999, 2003; 
Lee, Huynh and Hirscheim 2007) – usually this concept stems from the work of Anderson and Narus (1990). To cope with 
high dependencies and high switching costs in an outsourcing context, the relative importance of the customer to the pro-
vider, in terms of economic (relative deal size in the provider´s overall-portfolio) and strategic (reference customer, access to 
new sectors) considerations, is used to assess the relative importance. Customers with high relative importance may have a 
better relationship quality.
Graf and Mudambi (2005) demonstrate the negative impact of a high geographic distance, which increases the complexity 
and difficulty of service coordination. High distances between outsourcing parties can also negatively influence the relation-
ship quality. People are less likely to see each other in person and might find it much more difficult to reach a consensus via 
telephone and mail or to build a trustful relationship.
Cultural compatibility between business and IT is reported to influence relationships within companies (IT business align-
ment) (Peppard and Ward 1999; Wagner et al. 2007), between organizations, especially in offshore situations (Dibbern, 
Winkler and Heinzl 2008; Holmström et al. 2006), but also when organization outsource within their local market (Wilkof et 
al. 1995).
CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY AND SETTING
Case Study Methodology
We test our proposed research model with a case study analysis. To derive sufficient results from a case study approach, 
these have to be prepared, conducted and analyzed thoroughly (Yin 2002). Following Dubé and Paré (2003) we identified the 
research question and made it explicit. The interview guidelines were refined using a pilot case. All interviews were con-
ducted with two to three researchers. They lasted about two hours and were tape-recorded. The collected data was transcribed 
and analyzed using MAXQDA and a self-developed case study database, which allows for a simple but efficient comparison 
of case data.
Case Study Setting
Our case study approach comprised the IT infrastructure outsourcing relationship of four banks located in Germany or Swit-
zerland. The comparison of the banks is supported by a very comparable and homogeneous setting:
• all banks outsourced the same IT function
• all contracts have nearly the same age
• all banks are in their first outsourcing cycle with the provider (the contract has not yet been renewed)
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• all interviewees are very experienced with outsourcing and were involved trough all phases of the deal 
Both the German and the Swiss banking industry consist of three different groups: private commercial banks, publicly owned 
saving banks and credit cooperatives, which tend to be smaller but much more common. Our case study covers one credit 
cooperative, two savings banks and one commercial bank. Further “demographic” information about the banks and the ana-
lyzed outsourcing deals are presented in table 1.
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
Sector Savings bank Commercial bank Savings bank Credit cooperative
Employees 1,000 * 500 * 4,000 * 2,000 *
Contract runtime 2004 – 2009 2005 – 2010 2004 – 2009 2004 – 2008
Outsourced ser-
vice
IT infrastructure IT infrastructure, Applica-
tion development and 
maintenance
IT infrastructure IT infrastructure
Outsourcing 
goal
cost savings cost savings cost savings cost savings
technical training of bank 
employees through pro-
vider
Interviewees Provider manager and 
service manager (data 
center)
CIO/ COO Vice provider manager Managing director
Table 1. Banks in the case study (*: exact number cannot be shown in order to ensure anonymity)
CASE STUDY RESULTS
The relationship quality differs between the surveyed banks. Although trust is regarded as one of the most important rela-
tionship quality dimensions by all interviewees, only one of the banks rates their trust level as medium, three rate it as low. 
Bank A reports trust in their provider to be totally gone, due to a longstanding problematic relationship.. For instance, they 
blame their provider for always delivering incorrect reports, which in turn requires the bank to spend much time reviewing 
the reports. Bank C and D both have a very formal relationship instead of a trustful connection. D points out that trust in-
creases from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy (in diametrical opposition to the formalization). The relationship between 
the employees on both sides at the operational level is much more formal than at the strategic level. Bank B has a more trust-
ful relationship with the provider´s employees, many of them have previously been working for the bank before moving to 
the provider firm when the outsourcing deal was initiated. 
A blames the provider for exhibiting a low commitment (“availability of personnel is always a catastrophe during holiday 
seasons”). B and D are quite content with the availability of provider employees, especially in case of problems. By contrast,
B regrets that the provider only allocates a sufficient amount of employees in case of severe problems. C cannot understand 
commitment to be a social variable. His answers always refer to the contract (“if we have a SLA on a task, the provider will 
show commitment otherwise we do not expect any reaction”). 
A describes the process to reach a consensus to be very difficult (“painful”). B is reasonably content, but has some unsolved 
problems in his relationship. Problems with the demand management and request for service processes could not been solved 
yet. C usually achieves a consensus quickly with his provider, but also admits to sometimes assert oneself. 
Conflicts arise quite often in the relationship of A, which is explained with the unsatisfactory service quality. Hence, pay-
ments are often withheld by the bank. B claims to have no more conflicts with the provider than with his formerly in-house 
IT unit. C has experienced a heavy change of conflicts over time. The relationship started with an adequate amount of con-
flicts and increased heavily after one year, since the service quality declined heavily. Finally, the conflict level decreased to a 
reasonable level. D reports only little conflicts. Both C and D withhold payments in case of failed provider performance.
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The interviewees of A complain that the provider lacks banking knowledge but also shows insufficient technical skills. B 
and C report some provider employees to have sufficient banking skills. In case of B, this banking knowledge improved sig-
nificantly over time. C differentiates between former bank employees, who changed to the provider, and the other provider 
employees. The former have good bank specific skills, the latter do not. Interestingly, C does not expect and require the pro-
vider to have bank specific skills. D reports the provider employees to have good banking knowledge, which is increased 
heavily during the relationship. 
A describes his communication with the provider to be frequently inefficient (“often only a monologue from the bank side”). 
B and D believe their communication with the provider to be efficient, but the efficiency increased during the relationship 
(D) and sometimes becomes emotional (B). 
B and C exhibit about the same forbearance towards their providers as their provider towards them. D is less forbearing than 
his provider. As customer, he expects the providers to be always much more co-operative. By contrast, A is forced to behave 
very co-operatively towards the provider. A very bad service quality and no intention from the provider to change this situa-
tion forces the bank to exhibit much more forbearance than it would like to show (“The provider has the stance of “I don´t 
care” towards us. To keep our business running we have to be forbearing”).
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D
Relation-
ship Qual-
ity
Low 
(no trust between parties;  
no commitment from pro-
vider, consensus is only 
reached with a high bank 
willingness´ to compromise; 
numerous conflicts; pro-
vider exhibits no banking 
knowledge; communication 
is inefficient; bank is forced 
to be forbearing)
Medium 
(medium amount of trust; 
medium commitment from 
provider; consensus is rea-
sonably reached; medium 
amount of conflicts, same 
as pre-outsourcing; some 
provider employees have 
banking knowledge; com-
munication is efficient but 
gets sometimes emotional; 
both parties exhibit a me-
dium forbearance)
Medium 
(little trust; medium com-
mitment (but not  expected 
by bank); consensus is 
quickly reached; little con-
flicts (totally different than 
one year before); few pro-
vider employees have bank-
ing knowledge; medium 
communication efficiency; 
both parties exhibit a me-
dium forbearance)
Medium to high 
(Little trust; high commit-
ment from provider, pro-
vides adequate personnel 
resources; few conflicts; 
provider employees have 
good banking knowledge; 
communication is efficient, 
provider is highly forbear-
ing, bank is not)
Interaction 
Structure
No regular interaction struc-
tures, provider employees 
are rarely on-site.
No regular interaction struc-
tures, but mixed work-
groups, on-site provider 
employees are integrated in 
the bank processes.
No regular interaction struc-
tures, but ten workplaces 
for the provider employees. 
Provider´s office is nearby.
Regular interaction struc-
tures between bank and 
provider:  Kick-off meet-
ings for projects, job shad-
owing for new provider 
employees, presentations 
for all provider employees 
to improve mutual under-
standing. Provider employ-
ees are almost always on-
site. 
Interaction 
Intensity
Weekly operational meet-
ing, tactical and strategic 
level no longer take place; 
medium informal interac-
tion
Weekly operational/ bi-
weekly tactical meetings; 
about 50% of the interaction 
are informal.
Weekly operational meet-
ings, tactical meetings every 
three months, strategic 
meetings on a regular basis 
(mostly informal); besides 
strategic interaction only 
little informal interaction
Weekly operational/ 
monthly tactical and bi-
annual strategic meetings; 
little informal interaction
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Service 
Quality
Poor to moderate (frequent 
breakdowns), no improve-
ment over time
Poor service quality com-
pared to pre-outsourcing 
situation. (explained by the 
centrally established out-
sourcing contract that could 
not be influenced, see be-
low)
Moderate to good (pro-
vider´s responsiveness is 
regarded too slow)
Moderate to good (provider 
did not deliver a promised 
business model), improve-
ment over time
Contrac-
tual Gov-
ernance
Too little and imprecise 
SLAs, bank is discontent 
with contract.
Bank controls providers’
reports
Contract is a global sourc-
ing contract that was de-
signed by corporate head-
quarters. Local organization 
is discontent with the con-
tract, because it could not 
influence its design. 
Bank controls providers’
reports.
Detailed SLAs, bank is con-
tent with contract (after four 
renegotiations).
Bank controls providers’
reports and also uses a very 
detailed and sophisticated 
control system.
Very detailed SLAs, bank is 
content with contract.
Bank controls providers´ 
reports and also uses a very 
detailed and sophisticated 
control system.
Context Bank has a low relative 
importance for provider, 
high geographic distance. 
Medium outsourcing ex-
perience. Totally different 
cultures.
Local organization has a 
low importance for the pro-
vider, global organization is 
very important for the pro-
vider. Medium outsourcing 
experience.
Bank has a medium relative 
importance for the provider. 
Medium outsourcing ex-
perience. Different cultures.
Bank has a high relative 
importance for provider, 
low geographic distance. 
High outsourcing experi-
ence.
Table 2. Summary of case study results
The availability of interaction structures is quite comparable for bank A, B and C. All of them do not have any structures 
like job rotations, regular trainings together with the provider or any electronic systems to share relevant information between 
both parties. But B and C have workplaces for the provider employees onsite, B has also mixed workgroups where bank and 
provider employees work together. Besides provider workplaces on-site, bank D has implemented a set of interaction struc-
tures. The relationship started with a training series for the provider employees to get an understanding of the financial proc-
esses. To deepen this knowledge, provider employees are encouraged to participate in a job shadowing program. Regular 
presentations from provider employees are used to sustain the provider´s business understanding. As a result, the employees 
of the provider are regarded as having a good banking knowledge and communication with them is regarded as efficient. 
Bank D reports that one outsourcing goal was the improvement of technical knowledge of the bank employees. Interestingly, 
all interactions structures at bank D are geared towards business knowledge transfer from the bank to the provider. Contrary 
to the stated outsourcing goal, there are no structures to transfer technical knowledge from the provider to the bank. Never-
theless, the close integration of provider staff at the bank site might allow the bank to technically train their employees on the 
job. Though, any interaction structures to transfer knowledge the other way around could be useful to achieve their outsourc-
ing goal. Bank B and C report that mutual understanding between bank and provider was heavily fostered in the beginning of 
the outsourcing relationship by the crew change of the technical bank staff to the provider. Both banks benefit from this ini-
tial crew change. The provider employees are overall regarded to have sufficient business knowledge. However, both banks 
do not plan to sustain this knowledge by using interaction structures as described above. Former banks employees that are 
now working for the provider might change to other departments within the organization of the provider or even leave the 
provider. Then, their accumulated knowledge about their former employer will be lost for the bank and the provider. These 
findings indicate the existence of interaction structures improve the relationship quality (H1) in terms of mutual understand-
ing, communication quality and the ability to reach a consensus.
The formal interaction intensity of all four banks differs only on higher organizational levels. Weekly operational meetings 
are common, whereas meetings on the tactical level take place every two weeks (B), every month (D) or every three months 
(C). Only bank C and D have regular meetings on the strategic level. Within the organization of bank B, strategic level meet-
ings do only take place at the corporate headquarters, not on the surveyed local level. Bank A had regular communication at 
the strategic level, but due to the bad relationship this communication level does not exist any longer. All banks take minutes 
or pending lists from their meetings, which are worked through afterwards. Informal communication is important, espe-
cially on the operational level for the day-to-day communication and coordination. Important decisions are often prepared 
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informally (B, C, D), but always set in formal meetings. None of the banks promote informal communication on a regular 
basis. From time to time, B has a joint lunch with the provider employees, C´s provider arranges an annual event to meet with 
the customer and D had a regular soccer game together with its provider, which was eventually cancelled. D complains that 
too much of the communication with the provider happens formally, which negatively influences relationship quality, espe-
cially the trust dimension. These observations indicate that the existence of a high level of interaction intensity, especially on 
the strategic level, positively influences the relationship quality (H2). Especially informal communication has a positive im-
pact on trust. This is congruent with Lee and Kim (1999) who found that the amount of communication is significantly re-
lated to partnership quality.
Bank A and B both complain about the bad service quality. Breakdowns are frequent, the provider reacts slowly and abso-
lutely not proactively (A). B´s IT related cost are 30% higher after outsourcing, while the service responsiveness and agility 
(especially for new products) decreased. C and D are more content with their provider, only the responsiveness could be 
higher. D´s service related projects are mostly on time and within budget, but D complains of a lack of provider proactivity 
(“they could have done much more further business with us, if they were more proactive”). Aside from the overall good ser-
vice quality, the interviewee is annoyed that the provider did not deliver the promised business model. This business model 
should have been developed by the provider to support its customer in its financial sector. These findings serve as an indica-
tor for the importance of the correlation between a thorough service quality and the relationship quality, especially the level 
of conflicts between both parties (H3).
Bank A and B both are discontent with their contract, but for different reasons. A complains too little and, if available, the 
SLA’s are too imprecise. The provider accomplishes the SLA-defined service quality but fails in many other areas without 
SLAs. B has an outsourcing contract that was designed by the banks headquarter and was imposed on all local organizations 
without the possibility of playing a part in the contract design. This situation leads to the bad service quality described above. 
Bank C and D have a totally different situation. Their contract and the SLAs are well designed and both are content with this. 
However, C had to renegotiate the contract four times within a time period of three years until it was satisfied. According to 
the regulations (e.g. Basel II), banks have to control their processes (including their providers) in order to guarantee stability. 
To meet these requirements, bank A and B check the reports of the provider they receive. Bank A complains the faultiness of 
the reports (“every report is seriously flawed”), which requires high expenditures of time for the bank to cross-check it. B 
wishes to check the reports more intensively in the future. Additionally, C and D have installed very sophisticated control-
and measurement systems to comply with the German financial law. C´s system consists of 600 measurement items, that al-
lows a very thorough control of both the banks overall IT systems and, in particular, the providers´ service quality. D claims 
that this system notifies him about errors even before the provider notices them. The findings indicate that a well designed 
contract in combination with a good control system positively influences relationship quality, particularly reducing the 
amount of conflicts. Contrariwise, a “too detailed” contract or an extensive control of the service leads to a decrease of trust 
(H4). This is congruent with Poppo and Zenger (2002) who found a complementary relationship between contractual and 
relational governance.
Out of the contextual variables, relative importance of customer to provider and outsourcing experience prove to be particu-
larly important. The deal volume of bank D is only small, compared to the overall provider portfolio. Nevertheless, D be-
lieves to be strategically important for the provider for two reasons: D offers the provider access to the credit cooperative
market sector in the German financial industry and is a reference customer. His provider uses this relationship for marketing 
purposes. In turn, A has also a small deal volume in the provider´s portfolio, but does not offer any strategic advantages for 
his provider. The local organization of B believes to be relatively unimportant for the provider. C rates his relative impor-
tance for the provider (in terms of the deal volume) as medium. These findings indicate that the relative importance of a cus-
tomer has an influence on the relationship quality, especially the commitment of the provider. This matches with results from 
Lee and Kim (1999), who found an association between dependency and relationship quality. The outsourcing experience of 
bank A, B and C are quite comparable. The surveyed deals are their first outsourcing experience and started three to four 
years ago. In the meantime, they gained more outsourcing experience by further outsourcing deals. D exhibits a much higher 
experience with outsourcing. Outsourcing is a strategic objective for this company for a long time. Nearly all IT services are 
bought externally.
Table 3 summarizes the impact of determinants on relationship quality dimensions. Positive impact is marked with “+“, nega-
tive impact is marked with “-“, followed by the bank name and a superscript number. The quotes related to these numbers 
and the hypotheses are presented in table 4. 
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Commitment Comm.Qual. Conflict Consensus Forbearance Mut.Underst. Trust
Interaction 
Structure
+ (A)1
+ (D)2
+ (B, C)3 + (C)4
+ (D)5
+ (B)6
Interaction 
Intensity
+ (B)7 + (B)8
Service 
Quality
+ (A)9
+ (C)10
+ (A)11 + (D)12
Contractual 
Governance
+ (C)13 + (D)14 – (A)15
– (D)16
+ (A)17
– (C, D)18
Contextual 
Factors
+ (D)19
Table 3. Summary of the impact of determinants on relationship quality
Hy
p.
Nu
mb.
Quote
1 “We usually provide a monologue instead of having a communication with our provider because the provider 
does not have a clear structure of contact persons.”
2 “Communication structures, in terms of defined contact structures and regular workshops, maintain effective 
communication.”
3 “We usually reach a consensus quickly with former bank employees who have changed to the provider at the 
beginning of the relationship.”
4 “Provider employees who have changed from the bank to the provider have good banking skills.”
5 “We train the provider employees which gives them an understanding of our processes and fosters their business 
skills.”
H1
6 “The relationship with the provider employees is very trustful because many of them changed from us to the 
provider at the beginning of the relationship.”
7 “The provider employees are fully integrated into our team because of regular interaction with them.”
H2
8 “The relationship is trustful because we are used to communicating mostly informally.”
9 “Conflicts often arise because of the bad service quality.”
10 “Conflicts are directly related to service quality. We started with both being low, then they increased signifi-
cantly and eventually both decreased.”
11 “If the service quality matches our expectations we are more lenient than in phases where we receive a bad ser-
vice quality”, “We experienced that the provider cannot deliver the best service quality at the beginning of the 
relationship. In this phase of the relationship we are more lenient than in later phases, where we expect the ser-
vice quality to match our expectations.”
H3
12 “The provider promised a business model for our financial sector but did not keep this promise. This is a major 
reason why the relationship is built less on trust than on formalistic behavior.”
13 “If we have a SLA on a task, the provider will show commitment.”H4
14 “We do not have many conflicts in the relationship because of the well-defined contract.”
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15 Bank is forced to be forbearing because of the insufficient contract ("we have to be forbearing because of the 
bad contract to keep our business up and running”).
16 “At the end of the day it´s all about money. Due to the detailed and defined penalties we do not have to be for-
bearing. For us, forbearance is a used as strategic behavior. Sometimes, when the provider must pay a penalty, 
we remit this fine.”
17 “Incorrect reports lead to distrust.”
18 “A very detailed contract in combination with a sophisticated measurement system leads to a very formalistic 
relationship without much trust.”
19 “The provider exhibits a high level of commitment within this relationship because we are of strategic impor-
tance for him. We offer him access to our financial sector and are one of his reference customers.”
Table 4. Quotes from banks regarding hypotheses
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The results for the two newly proposed determinants of relationship quality (interaction structure and service quality) and the 
two proposed relationship quality dimensions (communication quality and forbearance) are mixed. 
The analyzed business relationships show a positive influence of interaction structure and service quality on relationship 
quality. Banks with clearly defined contact structures towards their provider or defined knowledge sharing routines with 
their provider exhibit a better relationship in terms of a high communication quality. Mutual understanding is fostered as pro-
vider employees, who are trained by the bank in workshops, have a better business understanding. Furthermore, a change of 
staff from the bank to the provider has a positive impact on mutual understanding. Former bank employees exhibit higher 
banking skills. These findings support the proposed impact of interaction structures on relationship quality (H1).
Obviously, the bank managers who were interviewed emphasize a relationship between service quality and the amount of 
conflicts. Increasing service quality leads directly to fewer conflicts. In turn, conflicts will increase with decreasing service 
quality. Furthermore, one bank in our sample reports on the influence of service quality on trust. Despite the provider firm’s 
promise, it did not deliver a proposed business model, which resulted in a general distrust from the bank´s perspective. These 
findings support the proposed impact of service quality on relationship quality (H3). Both results encourage us to apply both 
determinants in further research. 
The findings on the proposed two new dimensions of relationship quality are less clear. Whereas communication quality 
seems to be a relevant dimension of relationship quality, the results regarding forbearance are ambiguous. Communication 
quality is highly influenced by the application of interactions structures. Relationships with clear interaction structures ex-
hibit a very good communication quality. Regarding forbearance, the results in this sample differ. One bank shows a higher 
forbearance when service quality is good and reports about decreasing forbearance when service quality declines. Another 
manager reports about the necessity to be forbearing to keep the business running. The provider delivers such a bad service 
quality that the bank could not keep their business going without a high level of forbearance. On the other hand, for one bank 
in our sample forbearance does not seem to be a dimension of relationship quality. Forbearance is used as a strategic element 
to force the provider delivering additional or better services. This bank sometimes forgoes penalty payments from the pro-
vider as an incentive to deliver additional projects or better service quality in the future. 
Forbearance should be critically examined in further research to decide if it is actually a suitable dimension of relationship 
quality.
The empirical validation supports the findings from prior literature that show the influence of interaction intensity (H2) 
and contractual governance (H4) (Goles and Chin 2005; Lee and Kim 1999; Poppo and Zenger 2002) on relationship quality
(Goles and Chin 2005; Lee and Kim 1999). In addition to the prior findings, the relationship between contractual governance 
and relationship quality should be examined closer. At first, a detailed contract and reports have a positive impact on rela-
tionship quality as, for example, fewer conflicts occur. Both instruments seem to be the basis for a trustful relationship. Then, 
if the contract gets more and more detailed and the control of contractually defined provider performances increases, the con-
nection between contractual governance and relationship quality seem to become diametrically opposed. Further contract 
specifications and controls will have a negative impact on relationship quality.
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In the next steps of our research we will interview a) the provider side and b) extend the number of cases on the bank side. 
Subsequently, a quantitative study in the German financial industry will be conducted in order to test the causalities between 
determinants and relationship quality.
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